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1961] RECENT CASES
fit need not be actual but merely potential, 8 although it seems clear that it
must be given as the result of a prior agreement analogous in nature to a
commercial transaction, 9 unless the facts themselves give rise to a commercial
situation.' 9 These rules apply equally as well to joint undertakingst and car
pools ' where the parties are mutually interested. It is evident that the tangi-
ble benefit conferred must not be the mere exchange of social courtesies, 13 but
must be of a direct 14 and pecuniary nature."5
The courts should distinctly hold in mind the question of whether the cir-
cumstances presented bring the case within the intent and purposes to be ac-
complished and the evils to be remedied by the guest statutes.16 The purposes
being to prevent "the proverbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand
that feeds lim",-7 those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture
should not be allowed to recover damages for ordinary negligence, for the
motorist should be accorded the status which incurs the lesser liability unless
his status is clearly and definitely changed by express consent or by facts con-
stituting acquiescence on his part to a status which entails the greater
liability.18
It has been held that where the arrangements between the parties are so
indefinite and casual that sociability is the dominant element then a guest ar-
rangement exists.19 In the instant case the arrangements are indefinite, a sub-
stantial tangible benefit is lacking and the main purpose of the guest statute
is being defeated. The inference of a tangible benefit which rests wholly upon




LABOR - CONFLICT OF LAW - UNION OFFICERS QUALIFICATION STATUTES. -
Plaintiff, a New York union official, was suspended from office because he
was an ex-convict and hence disqualified under § 8 of the New York Water-
8. Scholz v. Leuer, 7 Wash.2d 76, 109 P.2d 294, 299 (1941) ".... but the re-
quirements necessary to constitute payment for transportation such as to avoid the bar of
the statute were specifically delineated. Such requirements are (1) actual or potential
benefit in a material or business sense resulting to the owner or occupant and (2) that
the transportation be motivated by the expectation of such benefit."
9. See Sproule v. Nelson, 81 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1955); Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio
St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87, 90, 91 (1949); Angel v. Constable, 57 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio App.
1943); Voelkl v. Latin, 58 Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519, 523 (1938); Restatement,
Torts § 491 (comment C at 1274).
10. Hasbrook c. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87, 90 (1949).
11. See Brandis v. Goldanski, 117 Cal. App. 2d 42, 255 P.2d 36, 38 (1953); Beden-
bender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P.2d 630, 636 (1955); Voelkl v. Latin, 58 Ohio "St.
245, 16 N.E.2d 519, 522, 523 (1938); Restatement, Torts § 491 (comment C at 1274).
12. Brand v. Rorke, 225 Ark. 309, 280 S.W.2d 906, 907 (1955).
13. Brandis v. Goldanski, 117 Cal. App. 2d 42, 255 P.2d 36, 38 (1953).
14. See Angel v. Constable, 57 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio App. 1943).
15. Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal.2d 765, 167 P.2d 193, 195 (1946).
16. See Rogers v. Vreeland, 16 Cal.App.2d 364, 60 P.2d 585, 586, 587 (1936).
17. Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784, 785 (1947) "It will help to
bear in mind the purpose of these guest statutes: Clearly they were enacted to prevent
recovery by those who had no moral right to recompense, those carried for their own con-
venience, for their own business or pleasure, those invited by the operator as a mere gene-
rous gesture, 'hitch-hikers' and 'bums' who sought to make a profit out of soft hearted
and unfortunate motorists."; Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 520, 280 P.2d 630 (1955);
2 Harper and James, Laws of Torts, § 16:15 (1956) presents a very good discussion on
the purposes and interpretations of guest statutes.
18. See Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87, 89, 90 (1949).
19. Bond v. Sharp, 325 Mich. 460, 39 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1949).
20. See Lyon v. City of Long Beach, 92 Cal. App. 2d 472, 207 P.2d 73 (1949).
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front Commission Act of 1953.1 He brought an action to have the statute
declared invalid on the grounds of conflict with the National Labor Relations
Act of 1947 and the National Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959. The Supreme Court of the United States held, three Justices dis-
senting, that the statute was not in conflict with federal legislation. De Veau
v. Braisted, 80 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1960).
The Court in upholding the New York Statute seems to overrule the case of
Hill v. Florida.- In that case the Court held that a Florida statute3 was in-
valid on the ground that it infringed on the "full freedom" of employees to
choose representatives for collective bargaining which was secured by National
Labor Relations Act of 1947.-1 In distinguishing Hill v. Florida from the in-
stant case, the reasoning was tempered by the bad conditions present on the
New York City Waterfront.5 In delivering the majority opinion of the Court,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter states that the decision in Hill v. Flordia in no wise
obstructs this conclusion, because of the fact that the New York statute was
congressionally approved. 6
In delivering the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas states that he could
more nearly comprehend the thrust of the Court's ruling in this case if it
overruled Hill v. Florida. But to sustain the New York after striking down the
Florida law is to make constitutional adjudications turn on whimsical circum-
stances.
Only three other states have statutes of this nature.7 North Dakota seems
to be most severe in its law." In view of the language used in the North Da-
kota statute, it appears that a conviction for disorderly conduct in a police
magistrate's court would be as effective as a conviction for rape or murder in
imposing such disqualification.
In deciding this issue the North Dakota courts would have to contend with
the National Labor Relations Act § 8, and also a North Dakota statute9 that
1. Waterfront Commission Act of 1953 § 8: "No person shall solicit, collect or receive
any dues, assessments, levies, fines or contributions within the state from employees regis-
tered or licensed pursuant to the provisions of this act . . . . for or on behalf of any
labor organization representing any such employees, if any officer or agent of such organi-
zation has been convicted by a court of the United States, or any state or territory thereof,
of a felony .... "
2. 325 U.S. 537 (1945).
3. Fla. Stat. § 447.04 (1959). "No person shall be granted a license or a permit
to act as a business agent in the.state: . . . Who has been convicted of a felony.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). W.R.A. of 1947. "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing ... ."
5. 4th Report of the New York State Crime Commission, New York State Leg. Doc.
Co. 70 (1953). "The Commission reported that the skulduggeries on the waterfront were
largely due to the domination over waterfront employment gained by the International
Longshoremen's Association, as then conducted. Its employment practices easily led to cor-
ruption, and many of its officials participated in dishonesties. The presence on the water-
front in many influential positions of convicted felons was an important causative factor in
this appalling situation."
6. S. Rep. No. 653, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 49-50.
7. Florida, Fla. Stat. § 447.04 (1959); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-16;
Texas, Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. § 515 4 a, (4a) (1945).
8. N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-16: "No person who has been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude or a felony, excepting traffic violations, shall serve in any official
capacity or as any officer in any labor union or labor organization in this state. No such
person, nor any labor union or labor organization in which he is an officer shall be qualified
to act as a bargaining agent or representative for employees in this state .. ."
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 34-08-02: "For purpose of the interpretation of the provisions
of this chapter, the public policy of this state is disclosed to be that a worker of this
state shall be free to decline to associate with his fellows, but that he also shall have full
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gives employees the "full freedom" to designate representatives of their own
choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.
In comparing the North Dakota statute to the New York and Florida statutes
and the court's subsequent interpretation, it is submitted that the decision
reached in Hill v. Florida would be a controlling precedent in North Dakota
and the North Dakota statute would be declared invalid.
DAVID D. GORDON.
LANDLORDS AND TENANT - LIABILITY OF LANDLORD FOR DEFECTS IN LEASED
PREMISES - LIABILITY OF LANDLORD TO TENANT OR GUEST OF TENANT. - An
action was brought by a guest of a tenant for injuries due to a loose tread of
a stairway in the leased premises. The stairway of a two-story dwelling was
used solely by the tenant. There was no covenant to repair. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota held, two justices dissenting, that even in the absence of a
covenant to repair, the liability of the landlord is not restricted to those in-
stances where the lessor has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of
the premises, but includes those cases where he has information which would
lead an ordinarily reasonable man to suspect they exist and he is negligent for
failing to disclose this. The dissent was based on the fact that Minnesota had
consistently for sixty years held that a landlord is liable only for nondisclosure
of defects actually known to him. Johnson v. O'Brien, 105 N.W.2d 244 (Minn.
1960).
When the landlord retains control over part of the premises which is used in
common by several tenants. he is under an aflirmitive obligation to exercise
reasonable care to inspect and repair such parts of the premises and is liable
for injuries resulting from his failure to do so.1 But when, as in the instant
case, the area was used solely by the tenant, a different result should obtain.
In the absence of concealment of a latent defect known to the landlord, the
rule of caveat emptor applies to leases of real estate - the control of which
passes to the tenant - and the landlord is not responsible for injuries result-
ing therefrom.2 The only variation from the rule that the landlord is not liable
for injuries resulting from unknown latent defects in the premises over which
the tenant has control is the extent of the knowledge required to hold the
landlord liable for nondisclosure of the latent defect. Most jurisdictions re-
quire actual knowledge of the defect, 3 while other jurisdictions hold the land-
lord responsible for defects he should have known about. 4 A minority put the
landlord under the burden of discovering defects that would lead a reasonable
freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment .....
1. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Primus v. Bellevue
Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950); Timmons v. Williams Wood Products
Corporation, 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
2. E.g., Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Il1. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952); McDermott v.
Merchants Co-op Bank, 320 Mass. 425, 69 N.E.2d 675 (1946); Rhoades v. Seidel, 139
Mich. 608, 102 N.W. 1025 (1905). See generally I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 104
(3d ed. 1939).
3. Taylor v. Gregoff, supra.; Pburn v. Fourseam Coal Co., 303 Ky. 443, 197 S.W.2d
921 (1946); Davis Y. Manning, 98 Neb. 707, 154 N.W. 239 (1915); Skrzypczak v.
Konieczka, 224 Wis. 455, 272 N.W. 659'(1937).
4. Logsdon 'v. Central Development Ass'n, 233 Mo. App. 499, 123 S.W.2d 631
(1938); Charlton v. Brunelle, 82 .N.H. 100, 130 Atl. 216 (1925); Rhoades v. Seidel, 139
Mich. 608, 102 N.W. 1025 (1905).
